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BAR BRIEFS

There are now in force in this State the following Uniform State
Laws:
Acknowledgment Act,
Act Regulating Traffic on Highways,
Aeronautics Act,
Air Licensing Act,
Declaratory Judgments Act,
Desertion and Non-Support Act,
Firearms Act,
Illegitimacy Act,
Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act,
Motor Vehicle Registration Act,
Negotiable Instruments Act,
Proof of Statutes Act,
Reciprocal Transfer Tax Act,
Sales Act,
Veterans' Guardianship Act,
Warehouse Receipts Act,
Act to secure the attendance of non-resident witnesses in Criminal
Cases.
A. P. PAULSON,

A. W.

H. A.

AYLMER,
BRONSON.

Local Organization
Your Committee on Local Organization beg to report:
1. That owing to the financial circumstances it has been thought
best to make no considerable expense on the part of this committee.
2. The District Bar Associations have held splendid, enthusiastic
and very profitable sessions.
3. The various counties' organizations have held different meetings with such success and doing a lot of splendid help in their communities. Both the District and County Bar Associations have sent
speakers free of charge to all of the schools inquiring for them in their
various counties, and various different local associations have entertained teachers and principals of various town high schools over the
state, and on the whole the local associations have been doing good
throughout the past two years.
JOHN KNAUF,

Chairman.

THE LAW OF MORATORIA
C. L. YOUNG

The word moratorium is used to designate a suspension of all or
of certain legal remedies against debtors. We commonly think of it as
an incident of war. There was some legislation of the kind during
the Civil War. During the World War the federal government made
provision for the protection of soldiers and sailors engaged in war service
through the Soldiers' & Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918. A number
of our states, including North Dakota, passed similar statutes. In
popular discussion it is assumed that such legislation in the emergency
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of war is universally valid. That, however, is not the unfailing rule.
There are cases in which moratorium acts passed even under such an
emergency have been declared invalid.
It is urged that similar provision be made to suspend certain
remedies against certain debtors on account of extraordinary financial
distress incident to the economic collapse usually termed "the depression."
Consistent with this theory efforts have been made through legislation
to defer, in divers ways, the enforcement of mortgages on account of
defaults therein. We are concerned in ascertaining whether these efforts
constitute valid moratoria.
At the very threshold of our consideration we are faced with the
provision of the federal constitution that no state shall pass any law
impairing the obligations of contracts. From time immemorial it has
been the rule that the laws which subsist at the time and place of making
a contract enter into the contract and are a part of it as definitely as
if they were expressly incorporated in its terms. Otherwise it never
would be possible to determine what is the extent of the obligations
into which the contracting parties have entered. When a contract has
been made the law requires one party to perform the thing contracted
for and gives to the other the right to enforce performance by the
remedies then in effect. If by a later law the duty of one contracting
party is diminished the rights of the other are impaired. The result is a
change in the obligation of the contract which favors one party and
injures the other. It is such changes which states are proscribed from
making. This rule is absolute and the question is whether the moratorium
legislation of recent months violates it.
The answer I think is furnished by the decision of the supreme
court of the United States in Barintz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed.
93. The case involved a Kansas statute enacted in 1893 under conditions similar to those now prevailing. The act allowed a period of
redemption from foreclosure or judicial sales where none previously
existed. The controversy in the case centered about the argument that
the legislature changed only the remedy available to mortgagees and
judgment creditors. The courts said that whether the change be deemed
a change of remedy or of some other rule of law relating to the contract,
it deprived the plaintiff of a right which had been made inherent in her
contract. The change was one so marked that it seriously interfered
with the enforcement of the contract and such interference impaired the
obligation of the contract, within the meaning of the constitution. That
I think is the case with much of the legislation recently enacted.
One of the difficulties met in discussing such a subject is the
unfortunate notion commonly held that the constitutional rule happens
to be applied always in favor of creditors. This of course is untrue.
It is applied indiscriminately by the courts whether the party whose
rights are invaded happens to be the creditor or the debtor. It is most
often that such legislation is enacted to favor the so-called debtor class
and for that reason it seems to the suspecting that it is that class of
legislation which commonly is held invalid. However, the supreme
court of the United States in an earlier case, (Brine v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627, 24 L. Ed. 858), as widely cited as the Harnitz
case, applied the rule in favor of the mortgagor, who by a decree of
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court was being divested of the right to redeem from foreclosure sale
which was accorded to him by the statutes of Illinois in force at the
time his mortgage was executed. The rule is general and has been
applied impartially in favor of debtors or of creditors, as the circumstances required.
It is urged that the depression through which we have been passing
constitutes an emergency which justifies the exercise of the police
power in disregard of contract rights and obligations. That is to say,
business conditions may reach such an extremity that the legislature by
its fiat may suspend the operation of the constitutional inhibition against
the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
The police power of course is a convenient refuge for all who seek
the interposition of government in some particular enterprise. It must
be conceded that the United States supreme court, in its own language,
"has refrained from any attempt to define with precision the limits of
the police power." (242 U. S. 530.) Concededly the power is a broad
one. It, however, does have limits, though they have not been specifically
defined. Whatever may be the tests of the validity of its exercise
financial loss is not one of them.
Those seeking to justify a moratorium on the ground that it is a
police regulation apparently rely upon the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court sustaining the District of Columbia Rents' Act and a
similar New York statut6. In general these acts gave a tenant the right
to occupy rental property notwithstanding the expiration of his term,
subject to regulation by designated officials so long as he paid the rent
and performed the conditions as fixed by the lease or as modified by
these officials. These were measures induced by conditions arising out
of the World War. There was a tremendous influx of people into the
cities of Washington and New York resulting from unprecedented
activities relating to the conduct of the war. Housing conditions were
so acute that the demand and need for homes far exceeded the supply.
New construction was unprofitable and at a standstill. Landlords
profiteered in connection with new leases and demanded exhorbitant
rentals. Tenants in possession who were unable to comply with these
demands were evicted upon expiration of their leases and found it most
difficult to obtain other housing facilities. This condition became acute
and in the fall of 1920 in New York alone proceedings for the summary
eviction of tenants whose leases had expired were pending to the number
of one hundred thousand. The housing situation reached a point where
the public health and sanitation and morals and general welfare of the
cities were in danger. (Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 65 L. ed.
865; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 65 L. ed.
877.)
Since these decisions appear to be the basis of the claim that the
moratoria now so widely enacted should be upheld, it is important that
we observe their purport in the light of what the decisions themselves
contain and in view of the later attitude of the supreme court, itself
with reference to them.
It must be noted first that the acts sustained did not in any way
seek to modify any existing leases. They did not contravene in the least
respect the constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligations

BAR BRIEFS

of contracts except possibly in providing that property need not be surrendered on the expiration of a lease. They were enacted because the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare were in jeopardy on
account of the housing congestion.
In the next place, the court in the Block case reiterated what it
sometimes had said in previous decisions, that a legislative declaration
of facts that are material only as a ground for enacting a rule of law,
for instance, that a certain use is a public one, will not be held conclusive
by the courts. It happened that in that case there was an emergency
which was notorious but the legislature could not by its declaration that
an emergency existed which warranted the legislation, justify the legislation from the constitutional point of view if under well recognized
principles it contravened the constitution.
Then too the court bases its decisions upon the proposition that
the public health, morals and welfare of the city were involved. It
says: "It is with this condition and not with economic theory that the
state had to deal in the existing emergency." The court in the later
case of Chastleton Corporationv. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 68 L. Ed. 841,
said this: "If about all that remains of war conditions is the increased
cost of living that is not in itself a justification of the act." In the Block
opinion Justice Holmes said: "Housing is a necessity of life. All
the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control
are present. The only matter which seems to us open to debate is
whether the statute goes too far. For just as there comes a point at
which the police power ceases and leaves only that of eminent domain,
it may be conceded that regulations of the present sort pressed to a
certain height might amount to a taking without due process of law."
That these cases mark the limit to which the police power can
be stretched under the federal constitution is evident from what Justice
Holmes said in another decision, (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U. S. 393, 67 L. Ed. 322): "In general it is not plain that a man's
misfortunes or necessities may justify the shifting of damages to his
neighbor's shoulders. *** We are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change. As we have already said this is a question of
degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.
But we regard this as going beyond any of the cases decided by this
court. The late decisions upon laws dealing with the congestion of
Washington and New York caused by the war dealt with laws intended
to meet a temporary emergency and providing for compensation determined to be reasonable by an impartial board. They went to the verge
of the law but fell far short of the present act."
It seems to me that these rental cases and their subsequent interpretation by the court lead inevitably to the conclusion that the police
power may not be invoked in the existing emergency to sustain the
legislation in question. The subject matter of the new legislation differs
materially from that of the rent cases. Commendable as the efforts to
afford relief under existing conditions may be, it should be done in the
constitutional way. They go farther than the rent cases. As those go
to the verge of the law these go beyond.
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But the efforts to establish moratoria are not confined to the
legislative field. In some states executive proclamations have been used
to secure delay in the use of certain legal remedies. Such proclamations
have been issued here. There is no provision either in our constitution
or in our statutes conferring upon the governor of this state the express
authority to proclaim a moratorium. The making of law is a legislative
function. The governor is without power in his own right to make
law, but he is required to take care that the laws made by the legislative
assembly be faithfully executed.
There is rather a widespread idea that the operation of statutes
may be temporarily suspended by a declaration of martial law. The
executive here has not gone so far though he has used the military
power to enforce his orders. In this connection it should be remembered
that under our constitution the military shall be subordinate to the civil
power; that all courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due
process of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial
or delay, and that the governor shall be the commander in chief of the
military and naval forces of the state except when they shall be called
into service of the United States, and may call out the same to execute
the laws, suppress insurrection and repel invasion.
There has been no insurrection nor invasion, and no failure of
courts to function. Under these conditions may the governor lawfully
declare the existence of a situation for the purpose temporarily of
putting into effect with reference to property rights executive orders
for which no express constitutional or statutory authority exists? This
question I think is answered by the supreme court of the United States
in the recent case of Sterling v. Constantin, .- U. S ..... 77 L. ed. 254,
dealing with the attempt of the governor of Texas to limit the production
of oil by martial law. There proclamations were issued stating that in
certain counties of Texas a state of insurrection, tumult, riot and a
breach of the peace existed and declaring martial law in that territory.
The militia of the state was ordered to enforce and uphold the majesty
of the law subject to the orders of the governor. An injunction against
the enforcement of the governor's order was sought. On the trial of
the case it was found that there was no insurrection nor riot, no closure
of the courts, and no failure of civil authorities.
While the court says that by virtue of his duty to cause the laws to
be faithfully executed the executive is appropriately vested with the
discretion to determine whether an emergency requiring military aid
for that purpose has arisen and is permitted a range of honest judgment
as to the measures to be taken in meeting force with force, it does not
follow that every sort of action the governor may take, no matter how
unjustified by the exigency or subversive of private right or the jurisdiction of the courts otherwise available, is conclusively supported by
mere executive fiat. The conclusion was that the governor there instead
of affording protection in the lawful exercise of rights as determined
by the courts sought by his executive orders to make that exercise
impossible; that in the place of judicial procedure available in the courts
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which were open and functioning he set up his executive commands
which brooked neither delay nor appeal; that martial law established on
such a basis destroys every guaranty of the constitution and makes the
military power independent of and superior to the civil power; and that
civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together. So it
was held that there was no exigency in Texas which justified the governor in attempting to substitute executive orders for the action of the
courts, and if there was need of the exercise of the military power it
should have been called to the aid of civil authority for the purpose
of maintaining the exercise of its jurisdiction by the court, and not for
the purpose of over-riding it.
In the light of that very recent pronouncement it is quite obvious
to me that there is no situation now existing in this state which would
sustain the proclamation whereby the governor declares a moratorium.
No one is seeking to interfere with the orderly processes of the courts.
They are open for business and should be permitted to function. In
passing it should be noted that the case just discussed confirms the view
taken by our own court when a former executive, pursuant to a declaration of martial law, took charge of certain coal mining properties on
account of an existing strike. The supreme court decided the case without filing written opinions, but an able opinion was filed by the district
court. There it was said that the reason for martial law is necessity
to rehabilitate the courts, not to destroy them or usurp their powers.
Specific mention was made of the danger of despotism if the governor
could become supreme merely by declaring a state of insurrection to
exist. In such case, it was said, he could overstep into the legislative
department and say what laws shall be and into the judicial department
and say how the laws shall be interpreted.
Having dealt with legislative and executive moratoria it remains
for us to consider the powers of courts with reference to deferring the
use of legal remedies otherwise available. A few cases have had to deal
with the question. Recently an attempt was made in North Carolina to
restrain the sale of real estate in an action for the foreclosure of a
mortgage on the ground that there is a condition of depression throughout the entire country in finance and real estate, that business conditions
are unprecedently bad, and that on account of the scarcity of money
and poor market conditions it is impossible to obtain the fair market
value of lands at forced sales thereof. The writ was denied on the
ground that a financial depression or the unprecedented scarcity of
.money for ordinary transactions or the enforced stagnation of the real
estate market, is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of the equitable
powers of the court in the restraint of a sale. A number of cases dealing
with similar questions are cited. The court appears to deal with the
matter sympathetically and states that perhaps no court is wise enough
to declare with absolute finality that no economic or financial stringency
or distress would warrant the intervention of equitable principles in
restraining the power of sale in instruments securing debts. (Bohlich v.
PrudentialIns. Co., 202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335, 82 A. L. R. 974).
While the question before the Wisconsin court in a recent case
(Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N. W. 556) dealt with a wholly
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different situation, I think one might conclude from the opinion that it
would be inclined to go further in the direction demanded by the complainant in the North Carolina case than the court of that state was
willing to go. The Wisconsin case dealt with a deficiency judgment
situation. Property claimed under ordinary conditions to have been
worth two or three thousand dollars was sold at a foreclosure sale.
After paying the costs, about $500.00 was credited on the mortgage
debt and a deficiency judgment of nearly $1,400.00 was rendered upon
an original loan of $2,000.00. There was an application to confirm the
sale which the court denied. The supreme court takes judicial notice
of the fact that the present economic depression has not merely resulted
in a serious dislocation of the value of real estate, but also in the almost
complete absence of a market for real estate so there is no cash bidding
at sales upon foreclosure. The court says the question arises whether
a court of equity is wholly impotent to rise to the needs of justice and
see that the parties are fairly and properly protected. This is not a
situation in which ordinary logic with respect to values has much vitality.
The court repudiates the proposition that real estate is worth what
purchasers will pay for it and no more, and that if the only price
offered constitutes but a negligible part of its theretofore assumed value,
it nevertheless represents the value of the real estate at that time for
the reason that such a conclusion is shocking to the conscience of the
court, or as the old equity courts said, "to the conscience of the chancellor and to all notions of justice as applied to the situation."
It is the conclusion of the court that without the aid of a statute
it may in the light of the present emergency and because of the inadequacy of a judicial sale to establish the fair value of the security,
do one or all of three things. It may decline to confirm the sale where
the bid is substantially inadequate, or it may take notice of the emergency and after a hearing fix a minimum or upset price at which the
premises must be bid in if the sale is to be confirmed, or it may upon
application for confirmation, if an upset price has not been fixed,
establish the value of the property after a hearing, and as a condition
to confirmation require that the fair value of the property be credited
upon the judgment.
While the precise conclusion with reference to a deficiency judgment in that case throws no light directly upon the question of a judicial
.moratorium, the decision appears to me to be most illuminating upon
the attitude which that court at least might take upon an application of a
mortgagor for delay in some form in the prosecution of an action to
foreclose to final judgment. For instance, in the matter of extending
the time for answer to a complaint a court has a considerable discretion
and its action will be reviewed only in case of clear abuse of that
discretion. Likewise after issue is joined a trial court again is vested
with a large discretion in the matter of continuances of suits. It would
seem to me that if the economic depression may be given the consideration which the Wisconsin court gave it in the case mentioned for the
purposes of that suit, a trial court would be justified in giving it some
consideration in case of applications either for extensions of time to
answer or for postponement of trial, without subjecting itself to reversal
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on the ground of an abuse of discretion. To the extent that that may
be true the courts have the power without legislation to effect a moratorium in any case in which the facts justify it.
Just so far as this may be the case a judicial moratorium is preferable to any other which may be established for the simple reason that
each case there can be bottomed upon its own facts. A moratorium
can be granted to the. extent that it may appear to be wise to grant it.
Where the facts do not warrant it, it can be denied. Extension or
denial under such circumstances is a mere incident in the dispensation
of justice. A blanket moratorium is bound to work injustice because
it must be operative as to all of the class covered for a definite period
and without respect to the merits of an individual case. That is a valid
criticism both of legislative and executive moratoria to the extent that
they may be effective. It is my judgment therefore that any plan for
delaying the exercise of remedies in favor of creditors should be administered by the courts so that the relief granted to the debtor may accord
with the merits of his financial situation.
There is no virtue in speculating as regards the power of courts
at this time, independently of statutes. House Bill No. 182 which takes
effect July 1st makes specific provision for the extension of time to
serve and file papers, for the staying of the entry of judgment or
execution thereon, and for the deferring of terms of court if necessary.
I perhaps have indicated with sufficient clearness that I am inclined to
the view that the courts might recognize the emergency to the extent
of exercising these powers without the aid of the statute. Certainly
with the statute in force there will be no question as to the existence
of the power.
It is conceivable, however, that a question may arise as to the
extent to which a court may go constitutionally even under this act.
While the statute relates to the remedy only it has long been settled
that this fact is not conclusive on the question of validity. Changes
in the remedy may not go so far as to impair the obligations of contracts.
(Bronson v. Kinzie.) If a court through the liberality of its orders
should produce that result its act probably would be subject to modification. However, it is to be expected that a reasonable use will be made
of the power granted.
I had hoped also to discuss the moratorium of necessity. That
seems to me a very practical subject and one which is more effective
than all the other moratorium schemes yet devised. Time, however,
forbids its consideration here.
In conclusion, it may be said that the law of moratoria is in the
making. Never before, I believe, has there been so widespread an attempt
to assure delays in the enforcement of remedies against debtors. All
sorts of ingenious remedial devices have been incorporated in new
statutes. There will be a flood of litigation in state and federal courts
in which their validity will be adjudicated. We may expect some new
conceptions of the lengths to which such relief may go. But in the
meantime we shall have to adhere for our guidance to the principles
which appear to us now to be well defined and sound.-(Address at
Capital District Meeting, 1933.)

